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1 Introduction
For much of the period since 2000, when
Zimbabwe embarked on a major land reform
programme, the country has been isolated
economically and diplomatically from Western
countries. Following the land reform, there was a
withdrawal of aid by Western donors and
development banks, credit lines disappeared and
investment flows shrank dramatically. The
Zimbabwe government had to look elsewhere for
support, and a ‘Look East’ policy was announced.
China offered significant loans as well as other
forms of investment and aid, while Brazil
promised support too. In its isolation from the
mainstream development community,
Zimbabwe’s aid and investment relations were
reshaped. This has been the case in the
agricultural sector, as in other areas.
The agricultural sector is pivotal to the economy
of Zimbabwe, providing 14–18 per cent of the
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 40 per cent of
export earnings and 60 per cent of raw materials
for industry (AMID 2012a). But following land
reform, challenges of agricultural financing, land
tenure security and technical support have been
major challenges, and overall production in a
number of key crops has declined. Prior to the
abandonment of the Zimbabwe dollar currency
and the creation of a multicurrency environment
in 2009, rampant hyperinflation undermined the
economy. Alternative sources of finance were
essential, and the Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe
attempted a variety of programmes, supported
largely by loans from the Chinese. Meanwhile, the
Western donors only engaged on the basis of
humanitarian aid, refusing to support agricultural
development in the new resettlement areas.
Thereafter, formally recorded outputs from the
agricultural sector declined annually by 7.1 per
cent between 2000 and 2008, a cumulative
decline of 79.4 per cent over the period between
2002 and 2008 (Ministry of Finance 2009).
Agricultural exports and total exports declined
by 53 per cent and 27 per cent between 1999 and
2008 respectively (AMID 2012a). However, a
stabilisation of the macro economy was achieved
in 2009 with the formation of a Government of
National Unity, and in some areas – notably
tobacco and cotton – agricultural output has
been booming.
Since 2009, the agricultural sector and the wider
economy have been recovering, growing by 21 per
cent in 2009, 33.9 per cent in 2010 and 7.4 per
cent in 2011 (European Union 2012; Ministry of
Finance 2011). The 2012 growth rate is expected
to be 11.6 per cent (Ministry of Finance 2012).
Central to this growth, will be the revitalisation
of agriculture on the newly resettled lands. Under
the Fast Track Land Reform Programme
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(FTLRP), 90 per cent of former large-scale
commercial farmland (14.156 million out of
15.5 million hectares) was acquired and
distributed among 232,738 households (Scoones et
al. 2010; Pazvakavambwa 2007).
It is against this background that the government
of Zimbabwe approached China and Brazil
among other countries to explore opportunities
for aid and cooperation programmes to support
the country’s agricultural sector, including in the
newly resettled areas.
2 Political alliances
Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic
Front (ZANU-PF) was the governing party in
Zimbabwe from independence in 1980 up until
the inauguration of the Government of National
Unity in 2009. During that period, alliances and
positions maintained by the ruling party and
government were synonymous. After being
ostracised by the West and international funding
agencies following the land reform programme,
China was sympathetic to the plight of
Zimbabwe since strong links at party-to-party
level had been established in the 1970s at the
height of Zimbabwe’s liberation struggle. China
has been a natural ally which, along with Russia,
vetoed all United Nations Security Council
resolutions on sanctioning Zimbabwe. The
cooperative relationship with Brazil, however, is
more recent, and driven largely by commercial
considerations and a determination to assert
itself as a global economic power.
Ties between Zimbabwe and China were
strengthened further in 2003 at the height of
trade and targeted sanctions by developed
countries with the country proclaiming the Look
East policy. The policy aimed to expand trade
and bilateral relations as well as promoting
investments with China, Malaysia, Indonesia,
Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, India
and Russia (Machadu 2012). The relationship
has focused almost entirely on China, however.
This is largely due to links between the Chinese
Communist Party and ZANU-PF that date back
to Zimbabwe’s independence struggle, as well as
China’s espoused policy of non-interference in
the internal affairs of sovereign countries.
Notable high-profile visits between Harare and
Beijing and numerous Memoranda of
Understandings (MoUs) have been signed.
Programmes with China include those between
the two governments to those between non-state
entities. Government-to-government
programmes have been on building the capacities
of specified units of the Ministry of Agriculture
and its departments with the government of
Zimbabwe not paying for the assistance.
Cooperation between the private sectors of the
two countries is largely through contract farming
arrangements where the Chinese companies
provide key inputs that the beneficiaries repay at
the time of marketing the produce. Over the
years, there has been an expansion of contract
farming schemes for tobacco and cotton financed
by Chinese firms; particularly with tobacco.
Agricultural cooperation with Brazil is still
nascent, although now formalised with the
signing of an MoU towards the end of 2011 on
agricultural mechanisation and irrigation
development under the More Food Africa
programme. With work still under way in
developing administrative procedures in both
countries, the equipment has not yet been
supplied. The programme blends a government-
to-government technical cooperation
arrangement focusing on capacity building with
a commercial component for procuring farm
equipment on loan, subsequent maintenance,
and the repayment of loans. As part of this new
cooperation framework, a Zimbabwean private
sector concern has already built a giant ethanol
plant using Brazilian expertise.
All commercial arrangements between
Zimbabwean farmers and the private sectors of the
two countries are facilitated by the ministries of
Agriculture of the two countries which
additionally undertake an oversight role at both
ends. Yet while day-to-day engagements are
managed by the line ministry, higher level
political interactions govern the relationship,
especially for China. The solidarity shown in the
face of Western sanctions has been an important
facet of political relations in recent years, with
China having increasing influence in various
sectors, ranging from mining to the security sector.
3 China’s engagements in Zimbabwean
agriculture
Key cooperation programmes completed, under
way and planned between Zimbabwe and China
include the following list of engagements
outlined in more detail later in this section: an
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Agricultural Technology Demonstration Centre
(ATDC), Emergency Food Aid, a loan agreement
with the Export-Import Bank of China, a
donation of agricultural machinery by a
provincial Chinese government, and the training
of key staff in the government of Zimbabwe’s
Ministry of Agriculture.
The US$30 million ATDC funded by China was
commissioned at Gwebi Agricultural College,
about 40km north-west of Harare. The centre is
in a prime farming area and presents an ideal
setting for experimentation and running
demonstrations. The three key objectives of the
ATDC are:
z The provision of a setting for showcasing
successes of technologies and methods of
production from China;
z An all-round training centre for agricultural
personnel, students and farmers;
z Provision of a centre for agricultural research
and technology development including
research in biotechnology.
The centre is a donation from the Chinese
government and was established as part of the
commitments made by China to Africa from the
2006 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC) conference and reiterated at
subsequent such gatherings. The centre was
commissioned in the first quarter of 20121 and
the Chinese company, Minoble, will run it for the
next three years, thereafter handing it over to
the host government. The centre will be
absorbed as one of the Ministry of Agriculture’s
centres of excellence in research and extension
that include research stations, farmer training
centres, and agricultural colleges.
In February 2012 China also made a US$14
million donation in the form of 4,910 tonnes of
rice and 9,723 tonnes of wheat to Zimbabwe as
Emergency Food Aid with the distribution
modalities left to the government. From the
country’s annual food needs, the donation
constituted 40 per cent and 3 per cent
respectively of annual rice and wheat
requirements for the country (The Herald 2012a).
In 2011, the China Export-Import Bank extended
to Zimbabwe a loan facility for US$334.7 million
for procuring tractors and supporting the
mechanisation programme for Zimbabwe’s
agricultural sector. Despite the loan agreement
being subsequently ratified by the Parliament of
Zimbabwe, it is yet to be drawn down. Some of the
sticking points include a stipulation for 10 per cent
down payment to activate the facility and that the
debt has to be fully amortised in five years using
agricultural produce.
At a lower, but no less significant level, the
consignment of agricultural machinery was
offered by the Sichuan Provincial Government of
China, and comprised of 10 farm trucks, 30
walking (two wheel) tractors and 50 water pumps.
Lastly, after the suspension of government-to-
government cooperation programmes with
traditional donor countries, China stepped in to
partly fill the void with study tours and short
courses for key personnel in Zimbabwe’s Ministry
of Agriculture. Parallel to that programme has
been the secondment of agricultural experts
from China to AGRITEX (the ministry’s
extension agency). Zimbabwe has been
specifying the preferred skills in staff that are
seconded. Ten experts have been coming on a
one-year placement, with the first group
completing their ‘tour of duty’ in 2011; in 2013,
ten more are expected. The experts were
seconded to AGRITEX Head Office and among
their responsibilities has been the capacity
building of the host institution in areas of land
use planning, horticulture and agri-business. The
experts developed training programmes and
accompanied AGRITEX staff on field visits and
extension outings. The Chinese government
provides a stipend and is responsible for the
general welfare of the experts.
In addition, a number of Chinese companies
have established themselves in Zimbabwe to
pursue business partnerships with local farmers.
As explored in the next section, contract farming
arrangements have been set up between Chinese
companies and Zimbabwean tobacco and cotton
farmers.
4 Chinese contract farming in Zimbabwe
Contract farming arrangements have been part
of Zimbabwe’s agricultural landscape in both the
crop and livestock sectors since the mid-1950s
(Woodend 2003), including in tobacco and cotton
(especially since the expansion of smallholder
production in the 1990s). In recent years,
contract farming arrangements have become an
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even more significant form of funding
agriculture in Zimbabwe as traditional sources of
funds have become less able to do so of late.
With the adoption of multiple currencies in
2009, a liquidity crunch has persisted with the
result that the local banking sector has been
even more constrained in its ability to provide
funding. Irwin et al. (2012) estimate the total
funding requirements for six major commodities
(maize, paprika, cotton, tobacco, sugar cane, and
coffee) at US$213 million and projected a
US$136.58 million financing shortfall in the
smallholder agricultural sector during the
2010/11 season. Tobacco and cotton under
contract farming arrangements, however, have
been better funded and are estimated to have
got as much as 70 per cent of total 2011/12
season agricultural funding (Irwin et al. 2012).
Both tobacco and cotton are considered suitable
for contracting arrangements as they are not
consumed at household level and the marketing
for each crop is through pre-determined
channels. The Chinese companies comply with
the same regulations as local companies: they
need to provide each contracted farmer with
adequate inputs for the contracted area; they
need to provide proof of access to off-shore funds
for purchasing the crop; and they are obliged to
sell a specified quantity of the total crop to the
local industry.
A Chinese company, Tian Ze Tobacco, has been
one such contracting company and had an
11.7 per cent share of the total contract crop
marketed in 2011 (TIMB 2012).2 In 2012, China
maintained its position as the top buyer of
Zimbabwe’s tobacco (The Herald 2012b). Tian Ze
Tobacco offered the highest average price among
all foreign buyers which was also higher than the
average price for last year’s crop (US$8.83 per kg
from US$7.27 in 2011). Most farmers contracted
by Tian Ze are from the newly resettled areas as
the company only contracts farmers who can
commit at least 10 hectares to the crop in a season.
The company has been providing farmers with
inputs and capital equipment needed, and
recovering its money at the time of marketing.
Each contracting company employs field officers
who intensely monitor farmers on its schemes at
all stages up until marketing. Of the companies
that had contracts with tobacco farmers in 2011,
Tian Ze offered the highest price – 13 per cent
higher than the average among contracting
companies (TIMB 2012).
Contract farming arrangements and the
significant influx of buyers for the Chinese
market have thus contributed significantly to the
revival of the tobacco sector. Over the years,
China has become Zimbabwe’s largest buyer of
tobacco with tobacco exports to that country
more than doubling between 2010 and 2011, and
constituting 21 per cent of Zimbabwe’s 2011
export crop (TIMB 2012). An added benefit with
exporting to China was the much higher price
that the country offered in comparison to other
destinations – a position that has raised the
average national price for that crop and helped
with Zimbabwe’s economic recovery.
Seen within the broader context, a key initial
consequence of land reform was the decline in
tobacco deliveries. By 2006, deliveries had
declined to a mere 23 per cent of the 2000 level
of 236 million kg.3 Deliveries have since been
recovering with tobacco accounting for 26 per
cent of the country’s total export earnings in
2011 (The Herald 2012b), and an expected output
of 133.6 million kg in 2012 (AMID 2012b;
Ministry of Finance 2012).
Contracting is also essential to the production of
cotton. An estimated 300,000 smallholder
farmers each commit an average area of 1ha to
produce cotton. This represents 99 per cent of
total production (Esterhuizen 2009) and 95 per
cent of it is grown under contract arrangements
(Makoshori 2010). Under contract
arrangements, farmers are provided with seed,
fertiliser and chemicals, and are in turn obliged
to hand over part of the harvested crop for the
purpose of loan recovery.
Cotton is the only crop whose level of production
was hardly affected by the FTLRP as it has
traditionally been grown by smallholder farmers
who have continued to be provided with inputs by
merchants. Among the agricultural commodities
exported, cotton brings in the second highest
receipts after tobacco, with US$150 million
realised from lint exports over the period 1 May
2008–30 April 2009 (Esterhuizen 2009).
Sino Zimbabwe Cotton Holdings (SZCH) is
among the smaller merchants that are registered
to buy the crop. The company has been accused
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of undertaking predatory purchases and not
grading the crop at buying, neither do they gin
by grade. SZCH is said to be among the
merchants who provided little or no production
inputs but were very aggressive at the time of
marketing through offering prices higher than
other merchants and not restricting themselves
to buying a crop they provided inputs for (MISA
2010). Unlike tobacco which is sold in Harare,
cotton is sold at the farm-gate often in remote
areas and it is alleged that SZCH buyers often
operate under the cover of local politicians and
that they buy any offered crop – even that grown
under contract with other ginners. Such
practices could hurt the industry in the long run
and some merchants are already scaling back
their input support programmes.
On the surface, South Africa is the single largest
buyer of Zimbabwe’s lint, accounting for 35–40
per cent whereas direct lint exports to China are
only 8 per cent of the total. However, much more
lint is exported to China from South Africa, with
South African firms providing a ‘warehousing’
role. With cotton production in Zimbabwe
continuing to grow, Chinese interests in the
sector look likely to expand.
5 Brazil’s engagements with Zimbabwean
agriculture
The flagship of Brazil–Zimbabwe cooperation in
agriculture is the More Food for Africa
programme. Brazil launched it in 2008 with the
aim of achieving food self-sufficiency at the small
farm level, and spent over US$2.3 billion on it
between then and 2010. Initiatives to extend the
programme to Africa began in 2010 at the Brazil–
Africa Dialogue on Food Safety, Hunger
Alleviation and Rural Development and have
been spearheaded by the country’s Ministry of
Agrarian Development (MDA). Brazil’s Chamber
of Commerce (CAMEX) approved US$640
million in lines of credit for the programme to
Africa in the 2011–12 financial year. Under the
programme, countries can obtain technical
guidance from Brazilian specialists and may
import equipment manufactured from that
country. Ghana and Zimbabwe were the first
African countries to join the programme.
In Zimbabwe, the programme was widely
publicised with the signing of the MoU in August
2011. According to the MoU, Zimbabwe will
receive agricultural machinery from Brazil
through a loan agreement worth US$98 million
and the primary beneficiaries are to be
smallholder farmers. The latest exchanges were
in late September 2012 when Zimbabwe’s
Minister of Agriculture visited Brazil to confer
with his counterpart to further consummate the
programme. Currently, some logistical issues
with Brazilian companies to supply the
equipment are being finalised, as are technical
specifications of the equipment and
arrangements for collecting repayments in
Zimbabwe. The main programme will focus on
the importation of Brazilian tractors; however,
an equally important component of the More
Food for Africa package for Zimbabwe could be
the supply of irrigation equipment, as it could
make a major contribution in resuscitating and
stabilising the agricultural sector and improving
food security, particularly in smallholder farming
areas.
Government officials in Brazil and Zimbabwe
will administer the programme. In Brazil, the
MDA will work with the companies supplying
equipment and ensure that quality standards are
maintained and prices are not increased unduly.
In Zimbabwe, government officials are expected
to train farmers in using the equipment and
monitor its use, including maintenance.
Zimbabwe government officials will continuously
assess agricultural production on beneficiary
farms and assist with ensuring that farmers
repay the loans.
The government of Zimbabwe will be the
borrower and will repay the loan within ten years.
Farmers are then expected to pay for the
equipment within 15 years at 2 per cent interest.
Considering the challenges with securing
adequate funding that the government of
Zimbabwe has been experiencing since the
Zimbabwe dollar was demonetised – for example,
registering a budget shortfall of US$98.6 million
between January and March 2012 (Ministry of
Finance 2012) – the government could encounter
problems servicing the loan, since the
repayments by farmers are not synchronised with
repayments to the government of Brazil.
A number of exchange visits by senior
government officials have also been undertaken
between the two countries in the lead-up to
signing the MoU on the More Food for Africa
programme and thereafter. From the
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government of Zimbabwe side, ministries
involved include Agriculture, Mechanisation and
Irrigation Development, and Finance and
Investment Promotion. The government of
Brazil has been represented by MDA, Embrapa
and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
Furthermore, a private investment firm, Green
Fuels, has set up a US$600 million ethanol
processing plant in Chisumbanje, South East
Zimbabwe, as a joint venture with the
Agricultural and Rural Development Authority, a
quasi-state institution on whose estate the plant
is located. The joint venture was to run for 20
years under a Build-Operate-Transfer
arrangement. The Brazilian private sector
provided the expertise in building the plant.
Sugar cane is supplied primarily by the estate
and is supplemented through out-grower
arrangements with surrounding communal
farmers. The ethanol is being sold as a 10 per
cent blend with petrol at a price slightly lower
than that of 100 per cent petrol. The product has
received a lukewarm response from the market;
without mandatory blending, the plant may have
to shut down. The project has been mired in
controversy with reports that a number of
communal farmers were forcibly evicted with no
compensation to make way for the expansion of
the estate. Discussions are currently under way
to run the project as a joint venture with
government, with mandatory blending being
enforced.
6 Perceptions, relevance and possible impacts
This section reflects on the distinguishing
features of cooperation programmes by Brazil
and China in the agricultural sector of
Zimbabwe, as well as the perceptions, relevance
and possible impacts emerging.
6.1 The nature of the cooperation programmes
Unlike programmes with traditional donors,
engagement with China and Brazil is at
government-to-government level, over the long
to medium term. Traditional donors have been
focusing on the poorest segments of the society
and have not expected any repayments from the
aid recipients. Moreover, they are only now
restoring direct links with government after
more than a decade. With the imposition of
trade restrictions on main state entities and
targeted sanctions on senior government and
(then) ruling party officials4 by the European
Union, Western donors have worked with NGOs
and others, as well as on relief and humanitarian
aid programmes.
By contrast, the average size of Brazilian and
Chinese aid per beneficiary is much larger, and
not focused on the poorest and most vulnerable.
For example, tractors are issued to individuals
and input packs for tobacco are for a minimum
of 10 hectares. Cooperation programmes with
China and Brazil support fewer beneficiaries,
and the ability to meet repayments is a major
consideration. Beneficiaries have to make full
payments on the inputs and capital equipment
supplied and cash cropping has hitherto been the
major component of such programmes. A major
advantage with the China/Brazil cooperation
programmes is that interest rates are much
lower than those prevailing on the local market.
The More Food for Africa programme will run
for at least 15 years and the Chinese contract
farming arrangements have no time limits.
Protocols related to Chinese and Brazilian
cooperation programmes are negotiated and
signed at government level and the Zimbabwean
government has provided the necessary
guarantees. Implementation is overseen by
government officials, unlike the case with
traditional donors who are not obliged to share
all information with government.
Cooperation programmes with Brazil and China
in agriculture are anchored on commercial
arrangements involving the private sectors of the
two countries and are ‘protected’ as they are part
of the aid protocols signed at government-to-
government level. With time, it is expected that
the current strong links at government level
between Zimbabwe and China/Brazil will be
replaced by stronger contacts between private
sector companies in Zimbabwe and their
counterparts in Brazil and China, with the
relationship continued on a commercial basis.
Cooperation with China, especially in tobacco,
has already made an impact by reviving that
sector. The higher prices that have been offered
for the country’s crop and the contract
arrangements in place have spurred farmers to
increase productivity. It is projected that if the
current trend continues, the pre-FTLRP position
could soon be surpassed. Enhanced tobacco
receipts are resulting in an improvement in
liquidity in the whole economy.
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6.2 Changing perceptions towards China?
Through engagements with China in wide areas
of the economy, many more Zimbabweans now
welcome Chinese investment. All political parties
now share the view that the Chinese are sincere
development partners, and the prime minister,
whose party has been somewhat ambivalent of
Chinese assistance is actively courting Chinese
investment in other areas of the economy – for
example, rehabilitating the country’s road-
network, increased power generation, and the
proposed giant pipeline of more than 400km from
the Zambezi river to supply water to the city of
Bulawayo with irrigation water being provided to
farms along the route.
Cotton farmers who benefited through
‘predatory purchases’ by SZCH were grateful for
the higher producer prices offered although, in
the long run, such a practice could be prejudicial
to the prospects of the country’s cotton industry
and the reputation of its lint exports.
Zimbabwe’s cotton has been ginned by grade and
its lint has been sold at a premium on the world
market due to its consistent quality. With reports
that SZCH has not been ginning the crop by
grade, there are fears that increased exports of
Zimbabwe’s lint by that company could result in
a loss of the crop’s premium status that had been
painstakingly acquired.
Finally, the inclusion of the ATDC as part of the
aid programme with China could be invaluable
in that it could change the widely held
perception that Chinese technology is inferior to
that of the West, with Chinese-made goods
earning the infamous tag Zhing-Zhong5 in
Zimbabwe. The Chinese will run the ATDC for
three years and thereafter hand it over to the
government of Zimbabwe.
6.3 Negotiated policy frameworks
While the government of Zimbabwe has
welcomed new development cooperation
programmes and investment plans, these are
guided by national policies. For example, all
foreign investments in the agricultural sector
have to conform to the Agricultural Policy (2012),
Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment Act
(2010) and the Industrialisation Development
Policy (2011). However, how such policies are
interpreted and implemented is open to some
discretion, given the economic challenges faced
by the Zimbabwean government.
The Agricultural Policy acknowledges the decline
in the provision of credit to farmers and agri-
business in recent years due to general liquidity
constraints in the economy, lack of collateral
security, high cost of lending to some farm
classes, insecurity of tenure and inaccessible low-
cost international lines of credit (AMID 2012a).
Contract farming arrangements through Tian Ze
and SZCH are in line with this thrust, and any
form of financing, including loan arrangements
which may result in increased indebtedness (see
Section 6.4) are welcome, given current
financing constraints.
The Indigenisation and Economic Empowerment
Act which became law in 2010 stipulates that ‘at
least 51 per cent of the shares of every public
company and any other business shall be owned
by indigenous Zimbabweans’6 (Government of
Zimbabwe 2010: 5). Under the Act, investment
licences are only to be issued to companies that
comply. In the case of an exemption, a timeline
for eventual compliance is set.
However, the Minister of Indigenisation and
Economic Empowerment has ruled that Chinese
companies are exempted from complying with
the law and that they are allowed to retain 100
per cent ownership since they are bringing in
funds for supporting contract farming
arrangements and are sub-contracting may
smallholder farmers. Tian Ze was specifically
mentioned in that regard, with it reported to
have supported 250 contract farmers in the
2011–12 season (Chibaya 2012).
The government of Zimbabwe has raised
concerns that most of its goods are exported in a
raw or semi-processed form rather than as
finished products. This earns the country less
from exports and keeps the general economic
activity in the country subdued. The contribution
by the manufacturing sector to the country’s
GDP declined from 20 per cent in 2000 to 10 per
cent in 2008 (MIC 2012). Cotton lint and tobacco
are among commodities that could be processed
further before export. The setting up of the
ethanol plant has been in line with the
Industrialisation Policy. In the long term, it is
envisaged that the project will establish even
stronger cooperation with Brazil, with the
ultimate aim of setting up a local assembly plant
for vehicles that run on high ethanol
(Mutambara 2012).
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All policies are thus open to negotiation, and the
preferential conditions offered to Chinese
businesses are witness to how such policies can
be reinterpreted. Opportunities for rent-seeking
by officials, as well as selective bypassing of
regulations by Chinese investors have been noted
by many commentators.
6.4 Growing indebtedness
Concerns have been raised on the implications of
the increased indebtedness of the country to
external partners through such cooperation
programmes. Zimbabwe’s current debt level is
unsustainable and fears are that however much
the aid programmes with China and Brazil are
welcome, and indeed are imperative, they could
entrench the country deeper into debt. The debt
to GDP ratio for Zimbabwe was 104 per cent in
2010 (World Bank 2012) and has since worsened.
As at June 2011, the country’s total debt stood at
US$8,754 million; two thirds of the external debt
(US$6,081 million) was in arrears and 75 per cent
of it was of a medium to long-term nature (World
Bank 2012). The country is currently auditing its
debt and developing a debt-restructuring plan.
Such initiatives need to be accompanied by a
major debt write-off by Zimbabwe’s major
creditors. In 2012 for instance, the country is
reported to have defaulted to the tune of US$200
million to China (Mashiri 2012).
As Zimbabwe pursues cooperation programmes
with China, Brazil and other nations, it needs to
revive ties with traditional donors that include
the European Union, the USA, Canada, Japan
and Australia7 and engage creditors with a view
to getting some of its debt pardoned.
6.5 Agricultural mechanisation: how appropriate?
The Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and
Irrigation Development is still developing the
agricultural mechanisation strategy for Zimbabwe
and it is expected that the mechanisation
components of the cooperation programmes with
Brazil and China will be central.
As work is still under way in finalising the
structure and components of the More Food for
Africa cooperation programme with Brazil, it
may be premature to comment on the suitability
of the programme and its probable impacts.
There have been inordinate delays in getting the
first shipment of equipment made and it is
hoped that once administrative arrangements
are finalised, the programme will be rolled out
quickly.
Considering the average size of small farms in
Zimbabwe and their potential, the Brazilian
model of supporting ‘family farms’ through the
More Food programme may not be easily
transferable. Zimbabwean smallholder farms are
much smaller, with an average area of 2 hectares
cropped each year. Due to the small average areas
per household and low value of what is produced
in communal areas, land preparation has been
carried out by draught animal power rather than
by tractors. However, most beneficiaries of the
More Food for Africa programme could be drawn
from high potential resettlement areas, with
greater potential and larger farm sizes.
Evidence from farm settlement schemes in the
1980s showed the medium-sized tractor (65kw;
60–70hp) as most appropriate; the smaller and
larger units were less ideal due to higher
operational costs. Furthermore, each unit can
cope with an area of 60 hectares per year
(AGRITEX 1983). Rusike (1988), however,
questioned the appropriateness of tractors and
their management under smallholder farming
settings in Zimbabwe. Equally the government,
the FAO and some Western donors are
promoting no-till ‘conservation agriculture’, and
Brazilian-funded tractors certainly do not fit into
that remit.
7 Conclusion
While the investments of China and Brazil in
Zimbabwean agriculture have come at a critical
time, following a period of economic contraction
and investment and donor boycotts, there are
questions raised by the focus, modalities and
implications of these engagements.
Certainly contract farming arrangements in
tobacco and cotton as well as a deliberate policy
of strengthening ties with China have helped the
stabilisation and recovery efforts, especially since
2009. By contrast to the traditional donor support
to poor and vulnerable farming households under
the aegis of humanitarian and relief programmes,
Brazil and China have focused on investment for
growth, focusing on better-off farmers, with the
potential for expanding production. Many of
these are in the new resettlement areas which
have been off limits for Western donors, due to
continued sanctions.
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Cooperation programmes in the agricultural
sector with Brazil and China provide larger
individual investments per farm, are implemented
over a longer time period, include capital
equipment and are not restricted to the poor and
vulnerable smallholder farmers, but focused on
commercial production and growth opportunities.
As much as they have been initiated and driven at
government-to-government level, they are
anchored on commercial ties.
The agricultural cooperation programme with
China that started as a bilateral programme has
grown tremendously over the years and has
become dominated by commercial arrangements
between private companies and the quasi-state
institutions of the two countries. While such
cooperation programmes are credited for the
revival of the country’s tobacco sector, concerns,
however, have been raised in the cotton sector,
with SZCH accused of some underhand dealings
through buying a contracted crop, and
undermining quality controls.
Regarding Brazil, the roll-out of the agricultural
mechanisation programme is eagerly awaited,
bearing in mind the dearth of funding for the
agricultural sector – particularly of a medium
and long-term nature. For the More Food for
Africa programme to realise its intended
benefits, however, thought is needed on the
capital equipment suitable for each sector, as
well as its ownership and management and debt
repayment mechanisms.
In a period of economic and political isolation,
Zimbabwe by necessity has reshaped its
relationships with the wider world. As Western
countries have shunned Zimbabwe and imposed
sanctions and restricted investment and
financing, Zimbabwe has looked elsewhere. New
relationships with China and Brazil are pivotal,
and are redefining the nature of agricultural
development in terms of actors, commercial
arrangements and focus.
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Notes 
1 Commissioned by Zimbabwe’s Vice-President
Joice Mujuru.
2 In 2011, Tian Ze secured just over 50 per cent
of the crop exported from Zimbabwe to China
with other merchants supplying the rest.
3 ‘Zimbabwe Earns $517m from Tobacco’,
www.newzimbabwe.com/business-8672-
Zimbabwe%20earns%20$517m%20from%20
tobacco/business.aspx (accessed 1 December
2012).
4 The sole ruling party from independence in
1980 to 2008 was the Zimbabwe African
National Union – Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF).
Its stranglehold was only broken in 2009 when
a Government of National Unity was formed
with the Movement for Democratic Change
following disputed elections. The EU has since
been relaxing the sanctions but has not
completely lifted them.
5 A Zimbabwean slang word meaning cheap,
Asian-mostly-Chinese, of inferior quality. The
word made its appearance at the onset of
Chinese penetration into the Zimbabwean
economy at the turn of the twenty-first
century. It stems from the way the Chinese
language sounds to a Zimbabwean hearing it
for the first time, and from the names of the
Chinese manufacturers on the labels of many
cheap, low-quality products. Zhing-Zhong now
also means anything that is low quality, even a
person unfit for their occupation or station in
life. 
6 Indigenous Zimbabweans are defined as any
person who before 18 April 1980 (date of
independence) was disadvantaged by unfair
discrimination on the grounds of his or her
race.
7 Zimbabwe’s MPs critical of Mugabe’s ‘Look
East’ Policy argued that there is no basis to
neglect traditional markets in the West as the
country is still developing links with the Far
East markets (Chengu 2011).
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